![]() ![]() Adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack flowchart When the user is phished, the malicious infrastructure captures both the credentials of the user, and the token. Frameworks like Evilginx2 go far beyond credential phishing, by inserting malicious infrastructure between the user and the legitimate application the user is trying to access. Common credential phishing attack mitigated by MFA Adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing attackĪttacker methodologies are always evolving, and to that end DART has seen an increase in attackers using AitM techniques to steal tokens instead of passwords. Though the users’ credentials were compromised in this attack, the threat actor is prevented from accessing organizational resources. If the security policy requires MFA, the attacker is halted from being able to successfully sign in. With traditional credential phishing, the attacker may use the credentials they have compromised to try and sign in to Azure AD. Two of the most common token theft techniques DART has observed have been through adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) frameworks or the utilization of commodity malware (which enables a ‘pass-the-cookie’ scenario). If you sign in as a Global Administrator to your Azure AD tenant, then the token will reflect that. It also includes any privilege a user has in Azure AD. When Azure AD issues a token, it contains information (claims) such as the username, source IP address, MFA, and more. The user then presents that token to the web application, which validates the token and allows the user access. At that point, depending on policy, they may be required to complete MFA. To obtain that token, the user must sign into Azure AD using their credentials. To access a resource (for example, a web application protected by Azure AD), a user must present a valid token. Tokens are at the center of OAuth 2.0 identity platforms, such as Azure Active Directory (Azure AD). Microsoft DART aims to provide defenders with the knowledge and strategies necessary to mitigate this tactic until permanent solutions become available. Detecting token theft can be difficult without the proper safeguards and visibility into authentication endpoints. Users on these devices may be signed into both personal websites and corporate applications at the same time, allowing attackers to compromise tokens belonging to both.Īs far as mitigations go, publicly available open-source tools for exploiting token theft already exist, and commodity credential theft malware has already been adapted to include this technique in their arsenal. These unmanaged devices likely have weaker security controls than those that are managed by organizations, and most importantly, are not visible to corporate IT. In the new world of hybrid work, users may be accessing corporate resources from personally owned or unmanaged devices which increases the risk of token theft occurring. This poses to be a concerning tactic for defenders because the expertise needed to compromise a token is very low, is hard to detect, and few organizations have token theft mitigations in their incident response plan. By compromising and replaying a token issued to an identity that has already completed multifactor authentication, the threat actor satisfies the validation of MFA and access is granted to organizational resources accordingly. Recently, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) has seen an increase in attackers utilizing token theft for this purpose. ![]() For more information on IR services, go toĪs organizations increase their coverage of multifactor authentication (MFA), threat actors have begun to move to more sophisticated techniques to allow them to compromise corporate resources without needing to satisfy MFA. The Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) has been renamed to Microsoft Incident Response (Microsoft IR). Microsoft Purview Data Lifecycle Management.Microsoft Purview Information Protection.Information protection Information protection. ![]()
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